In this paper we study the impact of credit risk transfer (CRT) on the stability and the e¢ ciency of a …nancial system in a model with endogenous intermediation and production.
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In our analysis, we abstract from a number of potentially important problems that characterize current (immature) CRT markets and which may a¤ect stability and e¢ ciency, such as the concentration of risks due to a low number market participants, a lack of transparency (making it more di¢ cult to evaluate risk exposures), or mispricing because risk buyers may not fully understand the nature of risks involved. Rather we take a prospective view and focus on where CRT initiated by fully rational agents leads us when market imperfections become small, and compare this outcome with the socially desirable one.
To this end, we …rst develop a simple and tractable model of a …nancial system which allows us to study the above mentioned e¤ects of CRT. In this …nancial system …rms have access to both bank and market …nancing. Firms face a trade-o¤ between market and bank …nancing because of an asymmetric information problem arising from …rms'moral hazard. Bank …nancing helps to reduce the asymmetric information problem and gives …rms 'certi…cation'on the market.
However, banks are fragile and need to be compensated for taking up credit risk, thus making bank …nancing more costly. 2 Stability of the …nancial system is determined by the (endogenous) riskiness of the portfolios of the banking sector and other …nancial institutions, while its e¢ ciency depends on the ability of the …nancial sector to channel funds from households to …rms.
We then study the impact of CRT in this model. We begin by considering benchmark CRT, i.e., CRT in a world with (almost) no imperfections in CRT markets. We …nd that CRT unambiguously raises welfare, increasing both e¢ ciency and stability of the …nancial system. E¢ ciency increases because CRT enables banks to reduce the risk premium required on loans, thus increasing production in the economy. Stability increases because, …rst, risk is shifted out of the banking sector into a (assumed to be non-fragile) sector. While banks also increase their lending activities, this additional risk is transferred into the non-bank sector as well. In the case of no imperfec-tions in CRT, the economy achieves its …rst best and bank become pure 'originator-distributor' of loans.
Subsequently, we study perturbations of the benchmark case. First, we acknowledge that CRT may increase the fragility of the risk buyer. We …nd that CRT is still e¢ ciency enhancing but that it may reduce stability, regardless whether CRT takes place within the banking sector or across sectors. We derive a condition for cross-sectoral CRT to be stability improving and argue that this condition may hold in practice. We also address optimal regulation and …nd that it should encourage regulatory arbitrage across sectors. This is because regulatory arbitrage is necessary to provide su¢ cient incentives for …nancial institutions to choose a (socially) optimal allocation of risk across sectors.
Second, we study asymmetric information problems between risk buyer and seller. When CRT makes banks'less interested in the prosperity of …rms, this may result in less monitoring.
We …nd that, as a consequence, e¢ ciency in the economy can fall 3 but an increased riskiness of loans (due to less monitoring) does not challenge stability since the additional portfolio risk will be spread.
Finally, we consider CRT instruments that are ine¤ective, in the sense that they do not allow for a complete shedding of risk (for example, because of counterparty or legal risks). As a result, there will be limits to the extent to which risk can be transferred, which obviously reduces the bene…ts from CRT. However, we show that stability can actually fall due to ine¤ective CRT. 4 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our model of the economy. In Section 3 we analyze the benchmark case of CRT in the (near)-absence of market imperfections. Section 4 deals with the impact of CRT on the fragility of the risk buyers.
Reduced monitoring incentives and ine¤ectiveness of CRT instruments are analyzed in Section 5.
The …nal section summarizes and presents the policy implications. 3 This con…rms results in Morrison (2003) . However, in contrast to Morrision we …nd that these e¢ ciency losses do not necessarily cause disintermediation in the banking sector. 4 We have started to consider the implications of CRT for systemic risk in the …nancial sector by allowing for an impact of CRT on the likelihood of counterparty failure. Preliminary results suggest that as long as banks internalize the impact of their transactions on counterparty risk, CRT is still stability enhancing.
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Consider a two-period, one good, production economy. There are two types of agents in the economy: entrepreneurs (E) and investors (I). Entrepreneurs operate …rms with production technology y(k; e; i ) = f (k; e) i
where k denotes capital, e entrepreneurial e¤ort and i is a (…rm-speci…c) productivity shock (whenever it does not create confusion we suppress the …rm-speci…c index i). Capital depreciates completely in the production process. Exercising e¤ort causes private costs c(e) to the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs do no have a capital endowment and live only in the …rst period. 5 We make the following (standard) assumptions about the production function f (k; e) and the cost function c(e) to ensure interior solutions: f k > 0 and f e > 0 (both inputs are productive), f kk < 0 and f ee < 0 (there are decreasing marginal returns), f (k; 0) = lim e#0 f (k; e) = 0 (e¤ort is essential in the production process), c e > 0 (exercising e¤ort is costly) and c ee 0 (marginal costs of e¤ort are non-decreasing). Furthermore we assume f ek > 0 and f ke > 0 (capital and e¤ort are complements in production). For some of the results in the paper we need to assume more structure, in particular that f = k a e 1 and c ee = 0.
The production shock has an idiosyncratic (…rm-speci…c) component i and an aggregate component w . We assume that = 1 + i + w with E[ i ] = E[ w ] = 0, and thus we have
. The i 's are identically and independently distributed across …rms. We denote the variances of the shocks with 2 i = var( i ), 2 w = var( w ) and 2 = var( ) = 2 i + 2 w .
Investors are risk-neutral and are endowed with capital but have no production opportunities.
They have a storing technology that secures them a (gross) return of 1. There are no assumptions on the ratio of investors to entrepreneurs but it is assumed that the total amount of capital held by investors is su¢ ciently large to ensure that the economy is never capital-constrained, i.e., all worthwhile investments can be …nanced. Besides investing in the storing technology, investors can invest in banks (B) and nonbank …nancial institutions (NB). 6 Bs and NBs in turn invest in the …rms. While NBs have a pure channeling function, banks have additionally a monitoring technology. This technology enables banks to (costlessly) observe entrepreneurial e¤ort. However, they cannot communicate an entrepreneur's e¤ort choice to NBs.
The timing in the economy is as follows. At t = 0, entrepreneurs decide on the production inputs in their …rm and on the share of their …rm sold to Bs and NBs, and consume the revenues.
Bs and NBs raise capital from the investors to …nance purchases of the …rms. At t = 1, the productivity shock realizes, production takes place and investors consume the proceeds of their investment.
More formally, at t = 0, after having decided upon k and e, an entrepreneur sells claims to his …rm's output to NBs and Bs. 7 We denote with b the fraction of the …rm's output sold to Bs
(1 b denotes then the fraction sold to NBs). The entrepreneur's optimization problem can then be written as
where the entrepreneur's utility U (e; k; b) consists of consumption (equal to the revenues from selling to the Bs and to NBs is that when selling to a B, the entrepreneur is remunerated according to the actual e¤ort chosen e (since Bs can observe his e¤ort choice), while when selling to NBs his remuneration will be according to the NBs expectation of his e¤ort choice e e(k; b) based on the entrepreneur's choice of k and b. Since NBs are rational, they will correctly anticipate the entrepreneur's e¤ort choice in equilibrium, i.e., e e(k; b) solves e e(k; b) = arg max
Next we turn to the optimization problem for investors and …nancial institutions. Because of their outside option (the storing technology), investors require a return on capital of at least 1 (in expectation). Competitiveness of households then implies that the required expected return 7 Hence, it is implicitly assumed that the only contracts available in the economy are equity contracts. Allowing for more general contracts is not expected to change the main results as long as they do not allow a full separation of …rm risk and incentives to monitor.
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on capital for Bs and NBs is 1. Assume that there is no CRT. Then, Bs'(gross) return on their investment is
In absence of any fragility in the …nancial sector this would imply that the required (expected) return on investing in …rm's output is 1 (since the …nancial sector is assumed to be competitive as well), in particular: V B (w B ) = w B and V N (w N ) = w N . However, it is assumed that Bs become bankrupt at t = 1 if the loss in their portfolio exceeds a certain threshold (consistent with a value-at-risk constraint). If bankrupt, they incur an exogenous cost (for example, because the portfolio cannot be sold at a fair price). It can then be shown that for a normally distributed portfolio, the expected loss from bankruptcy for a bank can be written as
, where 2 B is the variance of Bs portfolio and B is a parameter that measures the expected cost of a unit of bank risk (see Danielsson and Zigrand, 2003) . Assuming that there is a one-to-one relationship between …rms and Bs (i.e., each …rm is …nanced through one bank only and this bank does not …nance other …rms), the expected value of the bank portfolio is w B 2 2 B with 2 B = b 2 f (k; e) 2 2 . 8 Since investors have to be compensated for the expected losses due to bankruptcy we have
Hence, Bs will behave as if they were risk-averse: their return pro…le is identical to CARA utility with an (absolute) risk-aversion parameter of . Similarly, fragility in the NB-sector implies
Besides causing costs to the …nancial institution itself, bankruptcy also causes social costs (for example due to bank runs, failure of payment system, counterparty risk). These costs are assumed to be borne by all investors in the economy and simply reduce the return on their investments.
These costs are not internalized by the …nancial institution and thus create a scope for regulation.
Analogous to (5) and (6) we denote the expected social cost of a B failing and a NB failing by we can write the expected social cost from bankruptcies in the …nancial sector (the social cost of 8 The assumption of a one-to-one relationship simpli…es the analysis in that respect that the risk premium required for loans only depends on the amount of …rm risk held by the bank. 7 …nancial instability) as 9
The following de…nition completes the description of the economy.
De…nition 1 An equilibrium allocation in the economy is given by a triple of actions (k ; b ; e ) for each entrepreneur, such that (k ; b ; e ) solve (2) , with e e(k; b); V B (w B ); V N (w N ) given by (3), (5) and (6):
Corollary 1 (Expected) welfare in the economy is determined by I (decreasing) and U (increasing).
Corollary 1 follows because an investors'welfare (=expected consumption) depends only on the expected social costs in the economy (since they earn an expected return of 1 on their investments in absence of instability), while entrepreneurs' welfare is solely determined by U as de…ned in (2). We will refer to I as the instability of the …nancial system and to U as the e¢ ciency of the …nancial system (since improvement in U can only arise from e¢ ciency gains in the …nancial sector that are passed on to the entrepreneurs).
Lemma 1
The FOCs for e; k; b in (2) are
Proof. Straightforward from (2).
Lemma 2 Increases in bank …nancing b and/or capital k increase the equilibrium e¤ ort choice, i.e., @e e=@b > 0 and @e e=@k > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
Equilibrium allocations in our economy are generally not …rst best. First, this is because agents'optimization ignores the social cost of instability (de…nition 1). Moreover, there is a second type of ine¢ ciency arising in production. This can be seen from the FOCs of the entrepreneur's 9 A crucial assumption in (7) is that the social cost of a (single) institution failing does not depend on whether other Bs and NBs are failing. Equation (8) reveals that chosen e¤ort is ine¢ ciently low (compared to the …rst best e¤ort choice, which would require f e = c e ). There are two reasons for this. First, because of the fragility of the banking system, banks require a risk premium for buying …rms output, i.e., V 0 B < 1 (follows from equation 5). Second, the entrepreneur is only remunerated according to the bank's stake in the …rm, adding another ine¢ ciency when the …rm is not fully …nanced by the bank. (9) shows that the capital choice is also not …rst best (which would imply f k = 1 because the marginal cost of capital is foregone consumption). This is because the risk premia required by Bs and NBs imply that the average market value of the …rm bV 0 B + (1 b)V 0 N is smaller than 1, and thus the return on capital is ine¢ ciently low. However, there is a potentially compensating e¤ect: a higher amount of capital invested in the …rm 'signals'a higher e¤ort choice to the NBs and thus increases the value at which the …rm can be sold to NBs (second term on the left hand side of 9). The reason for the positive signalling value of capital is that an increase in k increases the productivity of e¤ort (due to our assumption on the complementarity of inputs), thus increasing the equilibrium e¤ort choice, which in turn increases the e¤ort anticipated (e e) by NBs (Lemma V N (w N )), which have an impact on entrepreneurial actions and thus the e¢ ciency of the …nancial system. The model thus naturally allows us to study the impact of changes in CRT markets on the performance of the …nancial system.
Benchmark CRT
In this section we analyze CRT under ideal conditions. In particular, we assume that:
CRT does not increase the fragility of the institution buying the risk. This is ensured in our framework by studying CRT from Bs to NBs and assuming that the NB-sector is not fragile, i.e., N = N = 0 and hence
This assumption is relaxed in Section 4.
CRT does not create incentive problems between risk buyer and seller (for example, because of reputational reasons). Speci…cally, we assume that …rms are valued in the risk transfer according to their actual e¤ort level (while direct …nancing by the NB is based on inferred e¤ort). Note that, as discussed in Section 5.1. (where we relax this assumption), this does not imply that the NB can observe the actual e¤ort. 10 CRT is fully e¤ective in the sense that it allows banks (in principal) to shed all …rm risk from their portfolio (this also excludes leakage from the NBs back into the banking sector).
This is relaxed in Section 5.2.
We model CRT as follows. After Bs have bought claims to …rms (and hence entrepreneurs have set k and e), they can sell these claims to NBs at price p. Selling the claim entails a proportional cost on the value of the credit risk transferred, which is borne by the Bs. This cost has a broad interpretation in being related to imperfections in CRT markets (such as, for 1 0 It can be shown that this assumption produces the same results as would arise if …rms are valued in the CRT according to inferred e¤ort but the CRT process allows the separation of the …rm's risk from the …rm's output CRT (as would be possible when Arrow-Debreu-securities are traded), i.e., the CRT instruments do not pose incentive problems.
example, because of transaction costs). 11 Denoting a bank's exposure to a …rm (i.e., bank's risk taking) with g (g = bf since there is one-to-one relationship between …rms and banks), B's return at t = 1; given that a share q 0 of g is sold, is
Since NBs are risk-neutral ( N = 0) and competitive, and since it is assumed that CRT is valued at actual e¤ort, the price the bank is able to obtain is
B's return can then be written as
and analogous to (5) we have the bank value of …rm's output is
Since g is given when banks choose q, from di¤erentiating 16 wrt. q, the optimal proportion of the bank portfolio sold is 12
Inserting (18) into (16) we …nd that the value of …rm's output for the bank V B and the marginal bank value of output V 0 B are a¤ected by the cost of CRT
Hence, the possibility for Bs to sell risk subsequent to their investment in …rms changes their required returns on investment and will thus a¤ect entrepreneurial decisions. Substituting V 0 B 1 1 It is likely that there are additional …xed costs of CRT. However, their incorporation would not yield additional insights since they will not a¤ect marginal CRT decisions. 1 2 Note that because of our de…nition of the cost of CRT (equation 13), q is restricted to be larger than 0. Hence, equation (17) (implicitly) imposes restrictions on the model parameters.
and V 0 N (equations 20 and 11) into the entrepreneur's FOCs (8)- (10) we get
Equations (21)- (23) implications of a partial reduction in market imperfections. 13 From now on, we will use 'increase in CRT'and 'reduction in 'interchangeably.
Lemma 3 An increase in CRT increases intermediation b and e¤ ort e but does not a¤ ect investment. Banks' risk taking (bf ) goes up.
Proof. See Appendix
The intuition for the results in Lemma 3 is as follows. An increase in CRT (triggered by a reduction in ) reduces B's exposure to …rm risk which reduces the risk premium demanded and, hence, the marginal bank value of output V 0 B goes up. This leads, …rst, to an increase in intermediation b because it reduces the marginal bank …nancing cost relative to NB …nancing V 0 N V 0 B (right hand side of 23). Second, it leads to a higher remuneration for e¤ort e and thus a higher e¤ort choice (equation 21). Third, it increases the remuneration for capital to the extent that the …rm is …nanced by the bank (equation 22). However, there are two o¤setting e¤ects on the remuneration for capital, which come through the increase in intermediation b. First, an increase in b reduces the remuneration for capital since the marginal value of output for Bs is less than for NBs. Second, an increase in b reduces the value of the signalling e¤ect of k, since this applies only to the share of the …rm sold to NBs. In the proof of Lemma 3 it is shown that for our assumptions on the production function, all three e¤ects on capital exactly o¤set each other and thus the total impact of an increase in CRT on k is zero. 14 Finally, banks'risk taking goes 1 3 Costs are only one type of market imperfections. In subsequent sections we focus on other imperfection arising from incentive problems between Bs and NBs and ine¤ective CRT. 1 4 This independence result of capital on the …rm level is not expected to extend to the total amount of capital invested in the economy if the number of projects is endogenuous. This is because CRT increases the value of output VB and thus would make undertaking a marginal project worthwhile.
up because both intermediation b and average output f goes up (the latter because e¤ort has increased).
Proposition 1 An increase in CRT unambiguously raises welfare (i.e., it increases both stability and e¢ ciency).
Proof. 1. Stability: From (7) and N = 0 we have that stability increases i¤ @ 2 B =@( ) < 0. @ 2 B =@( ) < 0 follows directly from (18). 2. E¢ ciency: We have
where the …rst inequality follows because adjustments in the entrepreneur's choice variables will not make him worse o¤ ; the second inequality follows from @V B ( )=@ < 0 (from 19) and @e e=@ 0 (from Lemma 3).
Proposition 1 shows that, although banks take up more risk, the stability of the …nancial system increases. In principal, there are two e¤ects of increased CRT on the variance of banks' returns 2 B (which determine stability of the …nancial system since N = 0). First, increased CRT increases q and thus directly reduces 2 B . Second, bank risk taking g goes up, potentially increasing 2 B . However, equation (18) shows that 2 B is independent of g. This implies that any additional risk taken up by the bank is transferred to NBs, and hence the …rst e¤ect prevails.
The intuition for this result lies in the properties of the CARA-utility, under which the amount invested in a risky asset is constant regardless of the size of the portfolio. Proposition 1 further shows that e¢ ciency is also increased since an increase in CRT reduces the risk premium required by banks and thus reduces the cost of bank …nancing for entrepreneurs. Hence, welfare rises.
Proposition 2 For = 0 (full CRT) the economy achieves the …rst best outcome.
Proof. E¢ ciency: From (23) we …nd that the relative marginal cost of bank …nancing is zero, while the bene…ts from bank …nancing are larger than zero, hence b = 1; it then follows from (21) and (22) that f e = c e and f k = 1, implying that e¤ ort and capital are chosen e¢ ciently. Stability:
From (17) and (18) we have that q = 1 and 2 B = 0 and it follows that I = 0.
Proposition (2) tells us that when CRT is costless, there are no longer any ine¢ ciencies in the economy. The reason is that monitoring incentives and risk bearing can then be separated 13 without cost. Banks become pure 'originator-distributors'of …nance: they 'originate'all …nancing in the economy (b = 1) and thus ensure an e¢ cient e¤ort choice but distribute all claims to the NBs (q = 1). Thus, all …rm risk is held by the institutions that are not fragile.
CRT and Fragility of the Risk Buyer

CRT within the Banking Sector
In the previous section we analyzed CRT into a sector that is not fragile. From a stability perspective, the risk was simply disappearing. In reality, however, stability is likely be a¤ected by increased risk taking by the risk buyer. In this section we study CRT within the banking sector, where the presence of such an e¤ect is obvious. We continue to assume that there is no fragility in the NB-sector (this assumption will be relaxed in the next subsection). Since banks are ex-ante identical, gains from CRT within the banking sector can only arise from diversi…cation of idiosyncratic …rm risk. We therefore directly consider trade in the idiosyncratic risk component.
Assume to this end that B's portfolio at t = 1 is given by
where q refers to the extent to which idiosyncratic risk is sold. This portfolio could, for example, be the result of banks selling their claims on …rms to a …nancial institution which pools the claims and sells them back to the banks. Assuming that there are a large number of …rms, by the law of large numbers the pool bought back will only contain aggregate risk. Thus the operation e¤ectively sheds idiosyncratic risk from banks'portfolios.
Since idiosyncratic risk is not priced, we have that p = g(e) in (24) and analogous to the previous section the optimal q can be derived as
which implies a portfolio variance 2 B of 
where Lemma 4 has been used to substitute for g 0 (V 0 B ). If becomes su¢ ciently small, (27) will be negative.
The e¢ ciency result is obvious from the discussion of Proposition 1: Increased CRT reduces the risk premium required by banks and thus directly increases entrepreneur's utility. The impact on stability is less straightforward and generally ambiguous. As equation (26) 
CRT across Financial Sectors
We consider now CRT between the B and NB-sector and allow for fragility in the NB-sector:
Our model for CRT is similar to the previous subsection: banks sell claims to …rm's output to a …nancial institution which pools all claims but sells them now to NBs (which are thus buying only aggregate risk). Denoting with q B the fraction of a bank's portfolio sold,
analogous to the benchmark case we have Bs portfolio at t = 1 given by
NBs portfolio consists of their initial holdings of …rms (only consisting of the aggregate component, since idiosyncratic …rm risk is completely shared across NBs), the claims to …rms bought in the 15
where q N refers to the amount of aggregate …rm risk bought (expressed as a fraction of a bank's portfolio).
Lemma 5 Equilibrium CRT is given by
and resulting B and NB-risk is
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 An increase in CRT raises intermediation b (if B > 0).
Proof. See Appendix. For the remainder of this section, we simplify the analysis by assuming that k and e are constant.
Proposition 5 Increased CRT (i) improves stability for all if and only if
(ii) always increases e¢ ciency.
Proposition 5 reveals that for increased CRT to be stability-improving, it is not su¢ cient that risk ‡ows from the socially more fragile sector into the less fragile sector (we interpret and as private and social fragility, respectively). To demonstrate this, assume that B > N and B > N (the B-sector is socially and privately more fragile than the NB sector). Since B > N , there is a tendency for risk to ‡ow into the NB-sector (depending on the relative initial risk positions in both sectors, given by b), however, as can be easily checked condition (33) is not necessarily ful…lled. The reason is that because instability in the …nancial system is additive in the risks in each sector (equation 7), minimizing instability is similar to standard portfolio optimization with two uncorrelated assets: the variance minimizing combination of both assets involves investment in both assets (though relatively more is invested in the less risky asset).
What is the general intuition behind condition (33)? Ignoring the cost of CRT for the moment, when the ratio of private and social fragilities are identical across sectors (equation 33 with an equality sign), the private sector achieves a risk allocation across sectors that is also socially desirable. However, if the the ratio of private to social fragility is larger in the NB-sector (condition 33), the NB-sector behaves 'too risk-averse'from a social perspective, with the result that there is too much risk in the B-sector. A reduction in , reducing the cost of CRT, increases CRT into the NB-sector (equation 30) and is thus socially desirable.
Is condition (33) ful…lled in reality? The answer is not obvious. It is realistic to assume that B > N and B N , but, as mentioned above, this does not imply that condition (33) is ful…lled. However, given the large fragility of the banking sector, B may be substantially larger than N , while the e¤ective risk aversion in both sectors, B and N may not di¤er substantially.
Hence it is not implausible to conjecture that condition (33) is met.
The above discussion suggests that increased CRT is only welfare improving because the relative private fragilities are not leading to a socially e¢ cient outcome in the …rst place. This suggest scope for regulation. Regulators, through capital requirements and other regulatory instruments, can in practice e¤ectively set parameters B and N (keep in mind that implies a certain value at risk). Proposition 6 sheds light on what determines the optimal ratio of 0 s across sectors, r = R N = R B , in terms of maximizing stability.
Proposition 6
For …xed output f , optimal (stability maximizing) regulation r is given by
Hence, optimal regulation generally encourages regulatory arbitrage (
Furthermore, optimal regulatory arbitrage exceeds the relative externalities across sectors (
Hence, as our discussion above suggested, in absence of CRT costs ( = 0), r = N = B , i.e., optimal regulation sets the ratio of private fragility costs equal to the social costs. However, if
CRT is costly and r = N = B , CRT is ine¢ ciently low from a social perspective since banks have to bear the costs of CRT and thus transfer less. Optimal, stability maximizing regulation therefore sets r in excess of the ratio of social fragilities across sectors in order to compensate for this underincentive to transfer credit risk.
What can be said about the relative merits of cross-sectoral CRT compared to CRT within the banking sector? Our analysis suggest that cross-sectoral CRT may be preferable in several respects. First, it allows for the transfer of risk into the less fragile NB-sector. Second, it permits, in contrast to CRT among banks, for the complete shedding of additional risks taken on by banks.
Finally, diversi…cation gains are higher across sectors than within sectors. 15 5 Imperfections in CRT Instruments
Incentive Problems between Risk Buyer and Seller
So far it has been assumed that CRT does not cause incentive problems between Bs and NBs.
However, when buying …rm risk from banks, NBs may face the same problems as when buying from the entrepreneur directly, in that they cannot directly observe the entrepreneur's e¤ort choice. Hence, there may be an incentive for banks to agree on a lower e¤ort choice with the entrepreneur because the bank does not bene…t from e¤ort exercised on that part of the …rm it sells to NBs. 16 In practice there are several e¤ects that mitigate this problem and e¤ectively justify the assumption made earlier that …rms are in the CRT valued according to actual e¤ort. For example, banks'reputation may ensure that banks transfer only …rms which operate e¢ ciently. Additionally, CRT instruments may be designed to reduce possible incentive problems. 17 Furthermore, the risk buyer may be partially able to take over monitoring from the bank. However, these e¤ects will generally not eliminate the problem.
In this section we study the impact of these additional incentive problems caused by CRT.
Morrison (2003) has shown that CRT can reduce welfare and lead to disintermediation by undermining banks'role as an intermediary that mitigates asymmetric information problems in the economy. There may also be an impact on stability. When banks can transfer …rm risk, they may have less incentives to monitor …rms, and as a consequence, the riskiness of …rms may increase.
We deliberately choose a setup that maximizes the (adverse) impact of CRT on incentive problems by assuming that there are no mitigating e¤ects as described above. Consequently, a bank bene…ts from entrepreneurial e¤ort only according to its stake in the …rm after CRT (because the price at which the …rm is transferred to NBs does not depend on the actual e¤ort choice). 18 It is further assumed that banks cannot commit to retain a certain stake in the …rm after CRT. This assumption is plausible because credit derivatives are largely traded over-thecounter, which makes it di¢ cult to verify the extent to which a bank remains exposed to …rm risk after CRT.
The price at which a …rm's output can be transferred in the CRT depends now on the inferred e¤ort choice e e(k; r). Denote with e g = g(e e(b; r)) the bank's claim to output based on inferred output and let g = g(e) continue to denote the bank's actual claim to output. Analogous to the benchmark case ( N = N = 0) case we have
Banks'portfolio is given by
from which we can derive
Resulting bank risk and bank value of output are
The use of CRT instruments may even improve incentives, see Arping (2003) . 1 8 It is straightforward to generalize the analysis by studying intermediate cases, i.e., cases between the benchmark case and the analysis in this section.
Lemma 6 @V B =@g = (1 )(1 q) and @V B =@e g = (1 )q after setting g = e g.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 7
The FOCs for e; k; b are
with q = q( ) given by (37) Proof. see Appendix.
The di¤erence in the FOC for e compared to the benchmark case (equation 21) is the (1 q)
term on the LHS of (40). Since e¤ort does not a¤ect the price at which the bank transfers claims to the NB sector, the entrepreneur will only be remunerated according to the (anticipated) bank's stake in the …rm after CRT: b(1 q ). Hence, e¤ort choice is lower than in the benchmark case (for a given and thus q). The FOC for k (equation 41) changes in comparison to the benchmark case because signalling becomes more valuable than in the benchmark case since a higher inferred e¤ort choice does now also increases the bank's value of output. This is because an increase in the inferred output increases the price at which banks can transfer …rm output, which is represented by the additional term q(1 )b in equation (41). Similarly, the FOC for b also changes because of this increased value of signalling.
Proposition 7 An increase in CRT (i) enhances …nancial stability, (ii) eventually reduces e¢ -ciency, (iii) increases intermediation.
Proof. (i) Stability: immediate with (38) after setting e g = g.
(ii) E¢ ciency: For ! 0 we have from (17) that q ! 1. Hence, we get from (40) that e ! 0. From lim e#0 f (k; e) = 0 (assumption that e¤ ort is necessary for production), we obtain that f ! 0 and hence
Intermediation: For f (k; e) = k e 1 we have f e e e 0 (b)=f = c=b where c is a positive constant (see Appendix, proof for Lemma 3). Inserting in (42) and solving for b gives b = c=( +c (1 q(1 )) ).
Increased CRT increases stability for the same reason as in the benchmark case. In fact, the equation for 2 B (equation 38) becomes identical to (17) for g = e g. Thus, bank risk does not depend on additional risk taking (and hence there is only the direct stability increasing impact 20 of the risk transfer). This general insight suggests that even if …rms become more risky due to the reduced e¤ort choice (which is not modelled here), this will not impact bank risk since any additional risk will be shed by banks.
Due to the impact of CRT on banks' incentives, there are two counteracting e¤ects on ef…ciency. As in the benchmark case, increased CRT reduces risk premia and thus the …nancing costs, which enhances e¢ ciency. However, CRT now reduces banks' participation in the …rm.
This lowers the entrepreneur's remuneration for e¤ort and increases the ine¢ ciency in the e¤ort choice (in terms of the …nancial intermediation literature, the certi…cation value of bank …nancing is reduced). The net e¤ect is generally ambiguous. However, Proposition 7 shows that e¢ ciency eventually decreases. This is because as becomes small ( ! 0), banks will transfer the whole …rm (q ! 1), thus the entrepreneur will not be remunerated for e¤ort at all (the left hand side of equation 40 becomes zero) and his e¤ort choice goes to zero. Since e¤ort is assumed to be very productive at small levels, this process reduces e¢ ciency. 19 As in the benchmark case, a reduction in reduces the relative cost of bank …nancing (right hand side of equation 42). On top of that, the signalling value of b increases because an increase in increases the stake in the …rm ultimately held by the market and thus the importance of inferred e¤ort. As a consequence, perhaps surprisingly, although e¢ ciency is eventually reduced, this does not cause disintermediation, i.e., …rms do not substitute bank for market …nancing.
This result is in contrast to Morrison (2003) , who …nds that CRT tends to cause disintermediation. We conjecture that the di¤erence in results obtains because in Morrison's model banks incur a …xed cost of monitoring and that the e¤ort choice is discrete (to monitor or not to monitor). Hence, if the (absolute) certi…cation value of bank …nancing becomes small because of reduced monitoring incentive due to CRT, it is no longer worthwhile incurring this monitoring cost and certi…cation value becomes zero. Firms will then be completely market …nanced. In our model, there are no …xed costs and what determines the degree of bank …nancing is the marginal signalling value of bank …nancing (LHS of equation 42), i.e., the marginal certi…cation value. As described above, the latter increases due to increased CRT. On top of that, CRT makes bank …nancing less costly.
In reality, there are likely to be both …xed and variable elements in monitoring. Banks may choose not to monitor at all if their exposure to risk is small (…xed e¤ect), however, once above a 1 9 It should be kept in mind that our setup is extreme in that it maximizes the incentive problems caused by CRT.
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certain threshold, the incentive to monitor will generally depend on the size of the exposure. For a hybrid model with …xed and ‡exible monitoring elements we would expect that intermediation increases up to a certain point (because of the e¤ects described in our model) but eventually jumps to zero (when incurring the …xed monitoring costs is no longer worthwhile).
The fact that even though increased CRT causes ine¢ ciency it may not reduce intermediation suggests a potential problem: since their business is not undermined (and may even be strengthened) by this ine¢ ciency, banks may lack the incentives to develop CRT instruments that minimize incentive problems. As a consequence, welfare increasing innovations may not take place and regulation may be called for.
Ine¤ective CRT Instruments
In this subsection we relax the assumption that CRT allows banks to shed risks completely.
There are good reasons why a complete shedding of risks is unrealistic. In practice, CRT is subject to several imperfections such as basis risk, counterparty risk and legal risk (arising from uncertainty about the de…nition of credit events). CRT may also be incomplete in a broader sense. Transferring risk into the NB sector may increase the likelihood of failure in the latter.
Typically, a bank will have linkages with the NB-sector besides CRT. A failure in the NB sector may then leak back into the banking sector. As an example, consider an insurance company that has a credit line with a bank. In the case of a credit event, the insurance company may draw upon the credit line. Thus, (liquidity) risk is ultimately still allocated in the banking sector.
Such incompleteness in CRT can be formalized by recognizing that CRT instruments cannot provide a full hedge against banks'portfolio risk. To this end, we generalize our model of CRT from the benchmark case as follows. Assume that a CRT instrument for a speci…c …rm has a pay-o¤ g h . Denote with = cor( ; h ) its correlation with the bank's portfolio. Without loss of generality assume that > 0 (i.e., the bank has to sell the asset to hedge its portfolio) and assume furthermore 2 h = 2 . The benchmark case arises then in the case = 1. Banks'portfolio is then
and from the FOC for q we …nd
Proposition 8 If CRT instruments are ine¤ ective ( < 1), increased CRT will eventually reduce stability.
Proof. Analogous to Proposition 3, second part.
The impact of increased CRT on stability is generally ambiguous when < 1. on the hedging ability of CRT instruments. The more e¤ective instruments are ( "), the more additional risk taking can be spread. In the case of = 1, all risks can be spread and stability is unambiguously improved.
Summary and Policy Implications
This paper has analyzed the impact of CRT on the stability and the e¢ ciency of the …nancial sector. Regarding stability, our results suggest that with respect to CRT, individuals'incentives are generally aligned with regulators'incentives. Although banks ignore the social cost of a failure of their institution, due to their risk-aversion they have an incentive to diversify and to shift risk out of the banking sector, which tends to increase stability. Improving the opportunities for CRT strengthens these incentives and is consequently socially desirable. Banks'risk aversion ensures also that any additional risk they take up as a consequence of CRT (because of increased …rm …nancing or an increase in the riskiness of loans due to reduced monitoring incentives) are shed.
CRT also tends to enhance the e¢ ciency of the …nancial system. The diversi…cation it brings about reduces the risk premia required by …nancial institutions for …nancing …rms, which lowers …rms'…nancing costs and increases output in the economy. There is, however, a potential caveat:
to monitor.
In sum, our analysis does not indicate a systematic threat to the functioning of the …nancial system through CRT. The main problems of CRT seem thus to be limited to the immaturity of CRT markets (which may cause risk concentration, misevaluation of risks, lack of transparency etc.). Since CRT undoubtedly has bene…ts, this suggests that public policy, rather than restricting CRT, should aim to promote CRT markets (and thus overcome its imperfections) and, if necessary, direct CRT. Our analysis has highlighted several ways in which public policy can ensure that the bene…ts from CRT are maximized:
Regulatory arbitrage across sectors should be encouraged in order to better align the incentives for CRT in the …nancial sector with the social incentives to increase the stability of the …nancial sector.
CRT out of the banking sector should be preferred over CRT within the banking sector because it directs risks into a less fragile sector, brings about higher diversi…cation bene…ts and allows for a better shedding of additional risks taken on by banks.
Regulators should ensure that CRT instruments allow banks to e¤ ectively shed risk, for example by encouraging standards for the settlement of legal disputes of credit events or by discouraging the taking of counterparty risks. An e¤ective shedding of risk is obviously bene…cial for stability, simply because it transfers more risk. As our analysis has shown, however, it is crucial for the overall impact on stability in that it ensures that additional risks taken on by banks can be shed.
Regulators should promote instruments that minimize asymmetric information problems in the CRT transfer. This is because banks do not necessarily have incentives to reduce e¢ ciency losses arising from incentive problems between risk buyer and seller.
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and using (50) to substitute c gives
Proof of Lemma 4 The total derivative of g wrt is given by
From (50) 
where f e @e e @b =f = c=b (equation 49) has been used. With (65) and (66) we have that the RHS of (67) is increasing in , hence b 0 ( ) < 0. 
where g = e g has been used to obtain (72) and (17) 
where g = e g has been used to obtain (74) and (17) 
